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Comités de empresa en Europa: un análisis desde  
el modelo de agencia
Resumen
Este artículo estudia el papel que juegan los comités de empresa (o works councils europeos) 
en la toma de decisiones de la empresa. El trabajo utiliza un modelo de teoría de la agencia 
donde los representantes laborales deben monitorear la información provista por los gerentes 
de las empresas, procurando mejorar el bienestar de los trabajadores a quienes representan. 
Sin embargo, los representantes son estudiados como agentes económicos independientes 
quienes pueden perseguir intereses privados, no necesariamente alienados con los intereses de 
la fuerza laboral de la empresa. El modelo inicialmente considera que los trabajadores pueden 
dar incentivos monetarios a los representantes, contingentes a los resultados de su actividad. 
Para poder eliminar cualquier intensión de coalición entre representantes y gerentes, los traba-
jadores deben pagar altos valores monetarios a sus representantes, haciendo que el bienestar 
de los trabajadores se disminuya. En segundo lugar, el modelo utiliza un mecanismo más real 
de alinear a los representantes e introduce un modelo de elecciones al final del periodo. Esta 
estructura del modelo introduce un trade-off intertemporal a los representantes entre aceptar 
transferencias de una coalición con los gerentes en el primer periodo y perder las rentas de 
estar en el puesto de representantes en un segundo periodo. Las elecciones incrementan el 
costo de entrar en coaliciones con los gerentes y permite alinear más fácilmente los intereses 
de los representantes con el de los trabajadores.
Clasificación JEL: J50, J53, J83.
Palabras clave: representación a nivel de empresa, comités de empresa, colusión, elecciones.
Comitês de empresa na Europa: uma análise desde  
o modelo de agência
Resumo
Este artigo estuda o papel que cumprem os comitês de empresa (ou Work Councils Euro-
peus) na toma de decisões da empresa. O trabalho utiliza um modelo de teoria da agência 
onde os representantes laborais devem monitorar a informação fornecida pelos gerentes das 
empresas, procurando melhorar o bem-estar dos trabalhadores aos que representam. No 
entanto, os representantes são estudados como agentes econômicos independentes os quais 
podem perseguir interesses privados, não necessariamente alienados com os interesses da 
força laboral da empresa. O modelo inicialmente considera que os trabalhadores podem dar 
incentivos monetários aos representantes contingentes aos resultados de sua atividade. Para 
poder eliminar qualquer intenção de coligação entre representantes e gerentes os trabalhadores 
devem pagar altos valores monetários a seus representantes, fazendo que o bem-estar dos tra-
balhadores diminua. Em segundo lugar, o modelo utiliza um mecanismo mais real de alinhar 
aos representantes e introduz um modelo de eleições ao final do período. Esta estrutura do 
modelo introduz um trade-off intertemporal aos representantes entre aceitar transferências de 
uma coligação com os gerentes no primeiro período e perder as rendas de estar na posição 
de representante em um segundo período. As eleições incrementam o custo de entrar em 
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coligações com os gerentes e permite alinhar mais facilmente os interesses dos representantes 
com os interesses dos trabalhadores.
Classificação JEL: J50, J53, J83.
Palavras-chave: Dado Representação ao nível de empresa, Comitês de empresa, coligação, 
Eleições.
1 Introduction
Works councils are an important component of the industrial relations in Ger-
many and the European Commission has, recently, implemented mandatory 
laws to foster European Works Councils within multinational firms based in 
States Members (European Commission, 2002). Moreover, the fall in private 
sector unionism in the United States and United Kingdom have renewed the 
interest on workplace representation, where works councils are the most salient 
institutions (Weil, 2003). However, a series of corporate scandals involving 
works councils in Germany has generated some scepticism about the role of 
these institutions within organizations.1 In spite of the relevance of works coun-
cils on the firm performance and workers' welfare, our understanding of the 
strategic behaviour of elected works councils is not complete.
This paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency fra-
mework in which works councils are supposed to monitor manager's infor-
mation on behalf of the workforce. Managers may have an interest to make 
workers believe that the firm is facing low performance in order to extract 
additional effort which is ex-ante non contractible (Hart, 1983, 1995). In this 
situation works councils are supposed to provide workers with audited infor-
mation about the real state of the firm (Freeman and Lazear, 1995). However, 
works councils are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. 
As economic theory recognizes different levels of a firm's hierarchy may use 
private information opportunistically, possibly through coalitions against other 
1 For instance Klaus Volkert, one of the Germany's most powerful labour organiser and 
chairman of Volskwagen's works councils from the early 1990s until resigning in 2005, was 
sent to prison for accepting almost $3m in illegal bonuses, which damage confidence in the 
corporation an in its cooperative labour practice (The Financial Times, march 2008). Howe-
ver, scandals occurred not only at Volkswagen but also at other car manufactures like BMW 
and Daimler Chrysler. Also they affected Commerzbank and Europe's largest chip-producer, 
Infineon. “It's normal that the cases only come to light by accident and the 'dark' numbers 
are very high, but only 5% to 10% of cases become known,(...) We are speaking of the tip of an 
iceberg, but the problem is that we don't know how big the iceberg is”, says Peter von Blom-
berg, deputy chairman of the German chapter of Transparency International (The Guardian, 
2005).
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levels of the hierarchy (Tirole, 1986). Particularly, works councils and manage-
ment (i.e. the most informed parties) may form coalitions to misreport the real 
situation of the firm. So, if collusion is an issue on workplace representation 
workers must find a way to incentivize their representatives in order to align 
works councils' interest with workforce's goals.
The initial framework of this paper considers that employees can incentivize 
works councils through contingent monetary payments. Workers can give mo-
netary transfers to the works councils to deter potential collusive behaviour with 
other members of the firm (management). In states of nature where workers can 
be expropriated by potential coalitions, they should pay higher compensations 
to councillors (Tirole, 1986). Collusion makes contingent payments costly and 
reduces workers' payoff. It generates a negative effect on the workers' willing-
ness to implement workplace representation in firms where deter collusion is 
very costly. In other words, works councils as a representative institution with 
valuable private information should be compensated with salaries that take 
into account their auditing tasks and which should not be necessary setting at 
the same level of wages for a regular worker.
The second part of the paper considers a more realistic view of works coun-
cils, in which explicit monetary incentives for works councils are often unfeasi-
ble. Then, elections are the only mechanisms that constituents have to influence 
councilors in which they re-elect their worker's representatives contingent on 
first period outcomes and councilor's reported information. Additionally, if 
works councils are heterogeneous in their preferences for management's mo-
netary transfers the election process should take into account the likelihood to 
have non-congruent works councils within the potential candidates. Particu-
larly, workers face representatives that may or may not have congruent inter-
ests with them, in the sense that a congruent councilor dislikes management's 
monetary transfers (i.e. bribes). When only congruent councilors are elected a 
fixed wage equal to the wage of the employees is enough to recommend the 
worker's preferred action. However, when there are non- congruent councilors 
they should receive a compensation that takes into account potential bribes 
from management.
When councilors are well compensated for their representative activities 
they would face an inter-temporal trade-off between accepting management's 
transfers at first period and losing rents at the second period. Elections as the 
only mechanism to discipline works councils increase costs of entering on co-
llusive behaviour with management. When benefits of being in office are large 
enough representatives will try to behave in the employees' interest. The em-
ployees' capacity to deter collusion with an election mechanism hinges on two 
conditions: first, at least the benefits of being in office (salary) should be public 
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information (transparency); second, monitoring tasks that have been delegated 
to works councils should not have big gap on effort, thus means works councils 
should not be involved in personnel reforms in which effort has large impact 
on firm performance. The last condition implies that under costly employment 
reforms employees' welfare would be higher with other mechanism that repre-
sentative participation (i.e direct participation or referendum).
Finally, since councilors' compensation should increase with how much 
they weight management's transfers, we can compare monetary incentives 
with election mechanism. Since workers cannot set up councilor's compensa-
tion contingent on the state of nature, it reduces the workers' capacity to punish 
councilors with hidden information in some states of nature. This implies that 
the negative effect of non- congruent councilors under election on the workers 
willingness to implement works councils is larger than the same effect under 
contingent monetary transfers' case.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section two discusses the background of 
the problem and the related literature. Section three states the model and the 
benchmark of a firm without workplace representation. Section four studies 
the case where workers can give contingent monetary transfer and studies the 
effect of potential collusion on the implementation of works councils. Section 
five studies the case of elected work councils, in which workers can incentivize 
their representatives through elections. Section 6 discusses results in the context 
of European industrial relations. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background and Previous Literature
Several european countries have laws and institutions concerning with emplo-
yees' involvement and participation at workplace. In addition, the European 
Commission has implemented mandatory laws to foster European Works Coun-
cils through multinational firms. These laws give information and codetermi-
nation rights about financial and personnel issues like employment decisions, 
new production process and investment projects that affect the workforce. 
Legislation across countries differs with respect to works councils' objectives 
and rights, but a common element is that those committees possess rights to 
be informed about the firm's financial situation, which is relevant to personnel 
policies at workplace. Works Council's objective, often specified in legislation, 
is to foster labour and management cooperation with the goal of increasing 
the performance of the firm and protecting the interest of the labour workfor-
ce. Summing up, councilors should monitor manager's financial information, 
communicate the gathered information, and recommend it if is the case, new 
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personnel practices to workforce contingent on this information (Annex A.3 
presents a comparative table about laws on workplace representation for a group 
of European countries).
In continental Europe, particularly in German where works councils ha-
ve been viewed as essential part on the corporate governance and industrial 
relations, governments and firms consider that works councils should reduce 
conflicts related to employment policies between management and employees 
by improving communication and cooperation among parties. Although works 
councils are bounded to employees through elections, they are called to create 
peace and cooperation within organization (Roger and Streeck, 1995). However, 
recent scandals involving the German corporate culture have generated skep-
ticism on the role of those institutions. Recently, works councils' leaders and 
personnel management in big German companies have been involved on alle-
gations of bribes and corruption in the implementation of employment policies. 
The most well documented case with effects not only on the corporation but also 
on German politics has happened at the largest European carmaker Volkswagen, 
where the leader of works councils was found guilty of accepting management 
'bribes' to support certain aspects of corporate employment policies.
In spite of the fact that works councils play a relevant role on corporate 
governance and the European Commission has encouraged state members to 
implement European Works Councils, our understanding of the strategic beha-
viour of representatives is not complete. In this paper, we offer a new perspective 
in which employees' representatives are independent and informed agents who 
might pursue their private goals and are constrained by their concerns to be 
re-elected. The paper tries to answer important questions concerning industrial 
and labour relations: What are the consequences of workplace representation 
on the welfare of the workforce?
Both theory and empirical literature assume that works councils behave in 
the workers' interest. However, works councils have valuable information that 
they might use in their own goals. Then, given the widespread use of worker 
representatives and the recent directives of the European Community it is re-
levant to have a better understanding of the incentives of these agents within 
organizations. Works councils may be tempted to form coalitions with manage-
ment and audit unpopular employment policies against employees' interest, as 
recent scandals in Volkswagen Corporation have shown. The potential coalitions 
between management and employees' representatives reduce the employees' 
willingness to implement Works Councils when it is very costly to deter coali-
tion formation. Moreover, when employees incentivize their representative only 
through elections and flexible monetary transfers are unfeasible it stresses the 
lack employees' willingness to implement Works Councils.
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This paper can be related to three different existing literatures. First, literatu-
re on industrial relations studies the benefits and the pitfalls of worker represen-
tatives with rights to be informed about the workplace issues. On the side of the 
benefits, representatives, as supervisors of the manager activities, might create 
truthful relationship between labour force and management (Weil, 2003; Black 
and Lynch 2004; Zwick 2004). This truthful cooperation may improve the per-
formance of the firm and raise its long-run value. The social benefit of a worker 
representative comes from the fact that it eliminates the risk that workers could 
choose wrong effort when the firm faces financial troubles. “Councils are a very 
good communication channel, especially with regard to bad news...”. (Freeman 
and Lazear, 1995). On the side of drawbacks, workers with information rights 
could delay the daily decision-making and increase their bargaining power. 
From the perspective of shareholders, a higher bargaining power could destroy 
value in the long-run because workers could claim a higher profit shares (Hart, 
1983; FitzRoy and Kraft, 1987). Then the main implication of worker represen-
tatives' pitfalls is that the firm would discourage the implementation of any 
voluntary worker involvement in decision-making (Freeman and Lazear, 1995).
The analysis of benefits and pitfalls suggests that the comprehensive in-
formation rights of the Works Council make the impact of these institutions on 
firm's performance ambiguous (Addisson, et. al., 2003). On the one hand, coun-
cilors foster the trust that is necessary to establish productivity-enhancing work 
practices. On the other hand, they may use their bargaining power to negotiate 
less productive practices that require less effort. However, this cost can be redu-
ced if the industrial labour regulation introduces instruments that decouple both 
production and distribution processes within the firm. For instance, Freeman 
and Lazear (1995) claim that if a firm could set up its wages under a collective or 
industrial agreement the works council could improve the firm's performance. 
Our paper differs on the existing literature about worker representative on la-
bour relations by considering that representatives might pursue own goals and 
they are bound only by elections. By differentiating representative's objectives 
from employees goals, we can introduce the potential effect of collusion with 
management and its effects on employees' welfare and indirectly its effect on 
firm's performance.
Second, literature of collusion on organizations analyzes how a collusion-
free equilibrium might arise [Tirole (1986) and Tirole (1992)] and under which 
conditions allowing collusion equilibrium is an optimal decision (Kofman 
and Lawarée, 1996). With either hard or soft information a Principal may de-
ter collusive behaviour between an informed agent and a supervisor by pa-
ying monetary transfers contingent to reported information (Tirole, 1992 and 
Baliga, 1999), but if monetary compensations are fixed a collusive equilibrium 
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always arise when the supervisor weights positively entering on side transfers 
with the agent. In our model, with hard information and fixed payment to the 
supervisor (works council) a re-election mechanism might generate collusion-
free equilibrium if works councils' benefits of being in office are large enough 
to compensate any gains of coalition formation with management (bribes). In 
other words, elections increase the costs on the side of works council by entering 
on collusion with management.
Finally, our paper relates with literature on accountability of representatives 
through elections. Literature on political agency presents the basic result on how 
electorate might discipline politicians through elections. However, under some 
circumstances accountability generates wrong consequences to voters' welfare 
(Maskin and Tirole, 2004 and Besley, 2006). Both papers present a basic model 
of accountability where a better informed politician has incentives to choose 
the wrong action in order to please the electorate. In a setting of delegation in 
bargaining, Cai (2000) shows that an accountable union leader might extent an 
industrial conflict (strikes) in order to signalling his congruency with his consti-
tuency (industrial employees). This paper borrows the idea of accountability on 
the political agency literature to show how employees discipline works councils 
through elections and applies it to the problem of right effort allocation within 
organizations.
3 The model
We study an organization governed by industrial collective agreements on 
wages, in which employees and management should agree on personnel reforms 
concerning workforce within the organization. There are three parties: emplo-
yees (they), worker representatives (councillor or he) and management (she). 
We assume that a personnel reform improves organization's performance above 
a threshold that allows the firm to pay its collective wages. However, the per-
sonnel reform demands extra effort on the part of employees, but it cannot be 
contracted ex-ante, particularly, at the timing of collective agreements on wages 
were signed (ex-post inefficiency).
3.1 Production
We consider a firm in which output is determined by both a random variable, which 
measures productivity per worker, and a decision variable at workplace, which 
measures the extra effort of each worker:
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 x = θ + e
after labour contracts have been signed at the industrial level (collective 
agreements), firm faces productivity shocks that can affect its production. Na-
ture determines whether firm faces a high productivity shock (θ = θ) or a low 
shock (θ = θ), with D = θ – θ > 0. Workers might overcome with negative effects 
of low productivity when they exert additional effort (with e), which has a cost 
equal to ψe = ψ, or they cannot exert additional effort (with e) at zero cost ψe = 
0, but it increases the risk that the firm goes to low performance with negative 
consequences for the workforce. The difference between high and low effort is 
higher than the cost of additional effort (De = e – e > ψ). Firm's technology implies 
that output's level might take four possible values:
 H ≡ θ + e > θ + e > θ + e > θ + e ≡ L
under the lowest level of output L, the firm cannot pay the total wage-bill 
required by collective labour contracts. However, workers always can avoid 
this situation by exert high effort regardless the realization of productivity pa-
rameter.2
3.2 Players
There are “N” homogeneous employees each of whom may exert extra-effort 
and receive fixed wages. The workforce may elect one worker representative. 
After electing their representative they want to maximizes their utility that is 
given by wages net of effort less the councilor's fees s
 U = (N – 1) [w – ψe] – s
Firm's labour contracts are governed by collective industrial agreements 
where each worker should receive a fixed wage (w ≡ w). However, a firm with 
low performance (x ≡ L) can only pay an small part of its collective wage-bill 
(with w = w < w. The employees' payoffs depend on effort through the output's 
level. Exerting high effort always eliminates the economic problems of the 
2 The rank of the production assumes that De ≥ Dθ, this assumption is not relevant for 
the results, but it implies that extract effort adds more to the production than the productivity 
parameter.
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firm. However, exerting low effort, in some circumstances, pushes the firm on 
its lowest output. We assume w – w > ψ, which implies that employees prefer 
to exert high effort only in bad times in order to avoid the lowest output x ≡ L.
A risk-neutral manager maximizes firm's value, which is given by no repre-
sentative workers' output workers less wages
 Um = (N – 1) [x – w]
given the fixed wages and the firm technology, she always prefers to im-
plement a high level of effort independent of the realization of productivity.
Finally, a councilor may be elected from the workforce and he does not play 
a productivity role. He should acquire information about the productivity para-
meter and recommend the allocation of effort contingent on his observed infor-
mation. He receives a wage from his representative activities equal to s. But also, 
he might receive additional rents” from potential coalitions with management b. 
Councilors can differ in how much they weight management's transfers. We 
assume that there are two types of councilors, congruent and non-congruent 
with the workforce. A congruent councilor dislikes manager's transfer and non-
congruent councilors weights it positively. We characterize congruent counci-
lors with a parameter a = 0 and non-congruent councilors with a parameter a 
> 0. The utility of the Councilor is represented by v(⋅), with v(⋅) strictly concave. 
The councilor's outside opportunity is the wage for a regular worker (S0 = w).
3.3 Information
There are two types of asymmetric information in the model. First, after a co-
llective agreement has been signed the firm faces a productivity shock and the 
manager has perfect information about this realization. Workers are uninformed 
about this parameter, which is relevant for the effort decision at workplace. Wor-
kers believe that firm faces a high productivity shock (θ) with probability ρ and 
a low productivity shock (θ) with probability 1 – ρ. Parameter ρ is a measure of 
how much workers believe that the firm is under good situation and additional 
effort should not be necessary.3 The information problem arises because the rea-
lized parameter θ is management's private information and her dominant stra-
tegy is always hiding the realization of high productivity parameters. However, 
3 Another interpretation of ρ is the measure on how much workers are informed about 
the firm's productivity, which can be affected by the performance of other firms in the same 
industry or the economic conditions in general.
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they can improve their information by electing a councilor, who receives an 
informative signal r about the realization of productivity. We assume that there 
are four states of nature, indexed by i, and each state of nature i has probability 
ρi (with ∑ == p 1ii 1
4
): i) at state of nature 1, the manager observes θ = θ and the 
councilor observes r = θ; ii) at state of nature 2, the manager observes θ = θ and 
the councilor observes nothing r = Ø; iii) at state of nature 3, the manager obser-
ves θ = θ and the councilor observes nothing r = Ø; iv) at the state of nature 4, 
the manager observes θ = θ and the councilor observes r = θ. We consider hard 
information, in which councilor's information is verifiable.4
Second, employees are uninformed about councilor's preferences for 
management's transfers. They face a pool of potential representatives that may 
be either congruent with probability γ or non-congruent with probability 1 – γ. 
We assume that at the time when the manager bargains with councilor on effort 
allocation she has perfect information about the councilor's type.5
3.4 Timing of the game
The organization lives for two periods and workers can elect a new representati-
ve or re-elect the incumbent councilor at the end of the second period contingent 
to the councilor's reported information and the first period outcome. We use a 
simplified version of a two period model, and we model the game at the second 
period as perfect information case, in which everyone at the organization knows 
the productivity parameter.
Period 1: At stage 0 a collective agreement determines the level of wages 
w. Employees elect from a pool of candidates (congruent or non-congruent) a 
worker representative and determine his compensation (s). At stage 1 produc-
tivity parameter, θ, is realized. Managers observe that perfectly and an elected 
councilor receives an informative signal r. Both councilor and manager learn 
councilor's type. Workers are uninformed, but they have some beliefs about the 
productivity parameter (ρ) and they have some beliefs about the councilor's type 
(γ). At stage 2 manager and councilor can form coalitions to hide information 
and recommend effort. Workers exert the level of effort contingent with the 
disclosed information. If they are uninformed, they update their beliefs about 
productivity parameter. The output is realized and the firm might or might not 
4 This information structure follows Tirole (1986). Hard information implies that coun-
cilor cannot create information, he can only hide observed information.
5 By considering an informed management about councilor's type we avoid any signa-
ling game among them. This assumption implies that both parties know the technology of 
the side payments, which is standard assumption on collusion theory [see Tirole, 1992].
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pay its fixed wages (w)contingent on the value of x. At stage 4 re-election pro-
cess takes place. If the councilor is fired he receives the first period payments 
s and private rents if a coalition had been formed. If he is re-elected receives 
first and second period rents and potential rents from coalition. Period 2: Indi-
viduals do not discount the time. At the beginning of period 2, θ is realized and 
it is observed by everyone. Workers exert their preferred effort and councilor 
receives his compensations.
3.5 A firm without workplace representation
We analyze the potential coordination failures in a firm where employees are 
uncompensated by additional effort and this extra-effort is a workplace decision, 
which is chosen by workers. Employees know that management always prefers 
to extract additional effort of workers by misinforming about the real situation 
of the firm. Employees disregard what management says and take decisions 
contingent on their beliefs about productivity. For instance, when employees 
exert extra-effort their expected payoffs are N [w – ψ]. Their expected payoffs 
are N [ρw + (1 – ρ) w] if there is not additional effort. The following proposition 
states the traditional result on industrial relations about potential coordination 
failures on the allocation of extra-effort without workplace representation.
Proposition 1: In firms without workplace representation, if wages are fixed 
by collective agreements at the level w and employees are not compensated by 
the disutility of extra-effort ψ, employees exert high effort e = e if and only if ρ 





< 1  (1)
Proof: the proof of this proposition is straightforward, which is the result of 
comparing the expected payoffs of employees under both high effort N [w – ψ] 
and low effort N [ρw + (1 – ρ) w] and reorganizing for ρ.
Note that employees always prefers exert effort in bad times w – w > ψ, so 
ρ ∈ (0,1). In a situation where workers can be compensated by the cost of addi-
tional effort the optimal threshold is ρ* = 1 and extra-effort is always the opti-
mal solution (e = e). Result in proposition 1 shows the lack of flexibility about 
firm specificities on labour contracts governed by collective agreements, which 
cannot internalize the positive effect of additional effort on firm's output and 
under some situations optimist workers can push firm under critical situation. 
An empirical implication of result in (1) is that coordination failures on effort 
allocation should be more likely in firms where personnel reforms have high 
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costs for employees (i.e. high ψ) or wages loss under low performance is low 
(i.e. small wage's gap w – w). The traditional literature on works councils says 
that elected councilors can overcome with these coordination problems, so we 
should observe more Councilors in firms where potential coordination failures 
are important.
4 Workplace representation with contingent monetary transfers
The positive view of workplace representation states that this institution allows 
employees to be informed about workplace decisions through indirect partici-
pation, and increase employees' welfare by auditing real situation of the firm 
and avoid either the implementation of costly effort or coordination failures on 
decisions at the workplace. Moreover, works councils who has information on 
good performance of the corporation might bargain for employment policies in 
favour of workforce (Freeman and Lazear, 1995). In this sense works councils 
seems an important institution under industries with high level of uncertainty 
about productivity because they can in- crease firm's value by reducing the 
risks of coordination failures. However, councilor might be tempted to collude 
with management against employees by misrepresenting realized productivity 
parameter. Potential collusion between representatives and management might 
reduce the positive aspects of councilors' activities and decreases the employees' 
willingness to use them. In this section, we consider that employees may deter 
collusion by paying monetary transfers contingent to reported information. 
Since councilor's election does not play any role in this section we consider the 
stage 0 to stage 3 at period 1 (see timing in section 3.4).
The side transfers: worker representative and management may form coa-
litions against employees to hide evidence on the realization of productivity. 
Given the information structure, the councilor might reveal or hide a signal of 
a realized productivity. In case of collusion a management should compensate 
councilor by hiding it and gives side transfer at level b. A congruent councilor 
puts zero weights on management bribes (a = 0). A non-congruent councilor 
weights positively side contracts with management (a > 0). Given a, an uninfor-
med councilor (r = Ø)does not have discretion to form coalitions with manage-
ment and collusion does not arise. However, with a signal σ = θ councilor may 
hide it by entering on side contracts. Management can pay until ≡ (n – 1) pDe.6 
6 It is important to note that in bad times all agents within organization prefers to exert 
high effort to avoid the risk of low performance, which implies that there is not hidden infor-
mation when both manager and councilor have observed low productivity parameter θ = θ. 
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The level of b is determined by the fact that when councilor observes θ and dis-
closes it, employees implement their preferred action and management's payoff 
is (n – 1) [θ + e – w], but by hiding information councilor increases management's 
expected payoff in (n – 1) [θ + e – pDe – w], where p (> 0) is the probability that 
workers exert extra-effort in case of being uninformed.
Now we can state the employees problem when councilors are compensated 
with contingent payments. Employees choose the payment compensation for 
councilor such that maximizes the expected payoff of the (N – 1) workers subject 
to the participation of the councilor and the incentives constraints to collude 
with management. Formally the employees problem (P0) states that:
∑{ }( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )+ + +  +
=
πψ π ψ π ψN p W p W p W W p W p smax – 1 – – 1 – – – i i
i




∑ ( ) ( )≥
=






( )≥ + ∆απs s N e– 11 2  (4)
The objective function in (2) shows that at state 1 and state 4 worker repre-
sentative should report his observed information and workers know perfectly 
the realization of parameter θ, but at state 2 and 3 the worker representative 
does not have additional information and they choose between exert high effort 
with probability p or low effort with probability 1 – p. The participation constra-
int in (3) express the individual rationality of the councilor, he should gains at 
least the same as regular employee otherwise there is not incentives to become 
a representative. Finally, constraint in (4) express the incentive constraint of the 
councilor, which is obtained after consider the gains on coalition formation with 
management. Employees should be sure that councilor is better compensated 
by disclosure the real value in state 1 that the rents obtained by hiding it. In the 
next sections we consider the case of congruent and non-congruent cases.
4.1 Congruent councilors
A congruent councilor discloses his observed information in state 1 and state 4. 
Formally, with congruent councilors employees do not care about the potential 
coalitions with management and the constraint in (4) does not appear in the 
By simplicity we assume that the councilor has all the bargaining power on the side transfers 
with management.
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problem in the general problem (P0). The following proposition states the opti-
mal councilor's compensation, and optimal allocation of effort after contracting 
with a congruent councilor.
Proposition 2: In firms with a worker representative incentivized through 
contingent payments, when employees' wages are fixed by collective agreements 
at the level w and employees are not compensated by the disutility of extra-effort 
ψ: i) employees would contract with a congruent councilor and compensate 
him with fixed monetary transfers si = s0 ∀i = 1,2,3,4; ii) the allocation of effort 
is equal to low effort in state 1 (e = e), high effort in state 4 (e = e), and they exert 
high effort in state 2 and 3 if















Proof: in the annex A.1.
Part i) from proposition 2 states that if workers can sign contingent mo-
netary transfers with councilor and the latter reports honestly his observed 
information, councilor receives the same payment at each state of nature (full 
insurance). This fixed payment is equal to councilor's outside opportunity (i.e. 
si = s0 ∀i = 1,2,3,4), which is equal to the employees compensation at the collec-
tive agreements s0 ≡ w. In other words employees can improve information 
about productivity parameter at the lowest councilor's compensation. The part 
ii) states that better informed employees allocate their preferred level of effort in 
state1 and state 4. It implies that the risk of coordination failures decreases 
in state 4, when councilor's report is r = θ. In state 2 and 3, when councilor is 
uniformed about productivity, employees update their beliefs about low pro-
ductivity parameter using Bayes' rule. Given priori beliefs about productivity 
ρ employees exert extra effort if the updated beliefs about low productivity are 
larger than the priori beliefs.7
Condition (5) in proposition 2 differs from condition (1) in proposition 1 on 
the fact that the condition (5) is a function of the councilor's information structu-
re, who acts as an expert for the employees. This implies that even if employees 
are optimists about the realization of productivity parameter of the firm, works 
councils help to audit the bad performance of the firm and increases the infor-
mation structure of the employees. This result is a more general representation 
7 The only requirement for this result is that the uncertainty in state 3 is larger than 
uncertainty in state 2. In other words that the councilor should be more efficient in reporting 
high productivity.
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of the traditional view of monitoring tasks from works councils to audit bad 
situations of the firm in the sense that we allow for some levels of uncertainty 
on councilor's information Freeman and Lazear (1995). The next corollary gives 
the employees' expected payoff under congruent councilors.
Corollary 2.1.: In firms with a congruent worker representative incentivized 
through contingent payments and assuming that condition (5) is satisfied, the 






















Equation (6) shows that the employees expected payoff increases with the 
information technology of the councilor to audit high productivity levels (P1) and 
decreases with the fees per employee, which is decreasing function of the firm's 
size. This result support the empirical figures in Germany where works councils 
are common in large firms, where the cost of implementation should be lower 
than in small and medium- size firms (Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003 and Addison, 
Bellmann, Schnalbe and Wagner, 2004). However, this result is valid only 
when councilors are congruent with employees' interest.
4.2. Non-congruent councilors
In this section we analyze the case where employees know that the councilor 
would weight positively the potential rents from coalitions with management. 
In this case employees should care about potential coalition formation which 
are represented by the incentive constraint (4) in problem (P0). The proposition 
3 states the optimal councilor's compensation, and optimal allocation of effort 
after contracting with a non-congruent councilor.
Proposition 3: In firms with a worker representative incentivized through 
contingent payments, when employees' wages are fixed by collective agreements 
at the level w and employees are not compensated by the disutility of extra-effort 
ψ: i) employees would contract with a non-congruent councilor and compensate 
him with fixed monetary transfers shuch that s1 > s3 + s4 > s2;ii) the allocation of 
effort is equal to low effort in state 1 (e = e), high effort in state 4 (e = e), and they 
exert high effort in state 2 and 3 if
 















Proof: in the annex A.2.
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When employees exert extra-effort in state 2 and state 3 they must care 
about councilor's misreporting on state 1. Under this situation, if workers exert 
high effort in state 2 and 3 councilor's compensations should be equal to s1 > s3 
+ s4 > s2. With s1 = s2 + a(N – 1) De given by the coalition constraint. Since with 
this compensation scheme employees deter any potential coalition formation, 
councilor reports his observed information and management does not have 
incentives to bribe him. This solution follows the theory of collusion in organi-
zation, when employees exert high effort in state 2 and state 3, councilor's com-
pensation at state 1 should be higher than that for state 2 because employees 
should compensate him by reporting his observed information. Since there are 
not coalition formation at state 3 and state 4, the compensation on both states 
should be the same and equal to the outside opportunity s0. More important, in 
order to decreases incentives to misreporting at state 1, employees should pe-
nalizes councilor with lower payment at state 2, but this punishment is limited 
because councilor cannot receive negative payments. The next corollary gives 
the employees' expected payoff under congruent councilors.
Corollary 3.1.: In firms with a non-congruent worker representative incenti-
vized through contingent payments and assuming that condition (7) is satisfied, 
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1  (8)
equation (8) shows the effect of potential coalitions between management 
and councilor on the employees' payoff, which is captured by the term p1aDe. 
Note that employees can overcome with this effect by decreasing the monetary 
transfers in state of nature 2 s2. However, councilor cannot penalize with negative 
payments in any state, which limits the employees' capacity to use contingent 
compensation to deter potential coalitions.
The next proposition states the cost of contracting with non-congruent 
councilors, which determines the employees' incentives to contract with coun-
cilor that could form coalitions with management against the interest of the 
workforce.
Proposition 4: A collusion-free compensation scheme as in proposition 3 
would give the same expected payoff to employees than the case of congruent 
councilor if and only if the level of non-congruency a is lower than a threshold a*, 
otherwise the employees payoffs would be lower than the case of congruent 
councilors. Where a* is equal to:
Works Councils: An Agency Perspective


















Proof: when employees deter collusion they can reduce the payment of 
councilor in state 2 in order to decrease councilor's incentives to report state 2 
instead of state 1. With this scheme of payments employees can get the same 
information structure that the case of congruent councilors. However, it is pos-
sible only with positive values of s2. We use corollary 2.1 and 3.1. to compare 
the employees' payoffs with congruent and non-congruent councilors, such that
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 (10)
employees can achieve the same expected utility under congruent and non-
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if a = 0 the payoff in both cases is the same and s2 = s0 and s1 = s0, which is 
the case under congruent councilors. However, if a > 0, the compensation in 
state 2 should be lower than the outside opportunity s2 < s0, and from equation 


















however, the councilor cannot be punished with negative payments (i.e. s2 
≥ 0). In order to deter councilor's incentives to hide information in state 1 and 
claims that he observes state 2 (nothing), employees may set up the contingent 
payment in state 2 until its lowest possible value, such that s2 = 0. Including 
this value in (11) and reorganizing for a, we can get the expression (9) in pro-
position 4:
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Workforce can contract with non-congruent councilors and obtain the same 
level of utility and the same information structure than the case of congruent 
councilors when the preference for manager's transfers of non-congruent coun-
cilors are less than a*. Otherwise the workforce should compensate councilors 
with negative payments in state of nature 2, which is not possible. Ant contrac-
ting with a councilor implies reduction on the employees' payoff comparing 
with the case of congruent councilors.
Note that a higher threshold a* implies larger possibility to achieve the em-
ployees' payoffs with under congruent councilors. The threshold a* is a positive 
function of the level of compensation s0. This observation has large policy im-
plications because in order to incentivize the councilor and compensate them 
for his monitoring and acquiring information they should be compensated in a 
different way that a regular employee. Otherwise the potential capacity of em-
ployees to deter potential collusions between management and representatives 
are limited to those that the threshold is determined by equation (9).
5 Elected worker representatives
In the last section we assume that employees can sign contingent contracts with 
their representatives, which does not fit with the real situation of European In-
dustrial Relation about Workplace Representation. In general, being representa-
tive bodies, works councils are influenced by their constituents mainly through 
elections process. In this section, workers cannot give contingent monetary 
transfers to incentivize their representative and they use a re-election process 
to incentivize him. We consider the complete timing in section 3.4.
From the last section we know that a fixed compensation without elections 
might discipline only congruent representatives, but non-congruent represen-
tative always collude with management. We consider that employees choose a 
representative from a pool of congruent and non-congruent candidates. Instead 
of employees offer a compensation to councilor in stage 2 of first period they 
offer a probability to be re-elected contingent on reported information. So, at the 
beginning of second period incumbent councilors are re-elected or displaced by 
a new representative. Lemma 1 specifies the re-election rule that will take place 
at the state 4 of period 1.
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Lemma 1: when worker representatives are bound to their constituents only 
through elections and their compensations are fixed. Employees always re-elect 
a representative who reports additional information, thus means r = θ and they 
never re-elect a representative who reports nothing r = Ø.
Proof: with fixed councilor's compensation at level s = w, a congruent coun-
cilor always reports his information, but a non-congruent one has incentives to 
hide it. When employees receive a report without additional information they 
form new beliefs about councilor's type. Using Bayes' rule, the probability to 
face a congruent councilor (a = 0) contingent on uninformative report at period 
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so, employees do not re-elect an incumbent who reports nothing at first 
period, because it was a signal of non-congruency with their interest and they 
are going to choose a new representative who will be congruent with probabi-
lity γ (> γ) ■
The re-election condition in lemma 1 gives a trade-off between first period 
and second period rents for a non-congruent councilor. A councilor who hides 
information in state 1 receives the following expected payment:
 s + p1a(N – 1) De + p4s  (15)
the term s + p1a(N – 1) De is the first period payment, where councilor recei-
ves a fixed payment s under and he can receives some rent from the manager 
by recommend a high effort in state of nature 1 and 2. The term p4s is the second 
period payoff. If he hides information in state 1 and reports nothing instead 
of high productivity he will be fired for the next period with probability (p1 + 
p2 + p3) and he will lose the level of fixed payments in the second period (the 
second period everyone observes the realization of the parameter θ and there 
is not assymetric information). When a non-congruent councilor does not hide 
information, he receives:
 s + (p1 + p4) s  (16)
he is re-elected with probability p1 + p4. Then the election mechanism in-
centivize councilor to reveal his observed information if the expected payment 
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in (16) is higher or equal than the expected payment in (15), which gives the 
trade-off between present and future rents:
 s ≥ a(N – 1) De  (17)
Proposition 5 states who will be re-elected and the allocation of effort under 
lemma 1 and condition (17).
Proposition 5: Part 1: given lemma 1 and if s ≥ a(N – 1) De: i) both congruent 
and non-congruent councilors report their observed information. ii) An in-
cumbent councilor is re-elected with probability equals to p1 + p4; iii) If r = θ, 
employees allocate their preferred effort, but if r = Ø, employees allocate a high 
effort e = e if
 















Part 2: given lemma 1 and if s ≥ a(N – 1) De: i) Only congruent councilor re-
ports his observed information in state 1; ii) The incumbent congruent councilor 
is re-elected with probability p1 + p4. An incumbent non-congruent councilor 
always hides information in state 1 and is re-elected with probability p4; iii) If r = 
θ, employees allocate their preferred effort, but if $r=\phi $, employees allocate 
update their beliefs and allocate effort if
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Proof: Part 1: the proof follows lemma 1 and condition (17) s ≥ a(N – 1) De. 
If this condition holds any councilor reports his observed information. Given 
the information structure in section 3.3, councilor receives an informative sig-
nal with probability p1 + p4 and given lemma 1, employees re-elect him with 
the same probability. Given that councilor reports his observed information, 
employees improve their information in state 1 and state 4 and allocate their 
preferred effort. In case of non-additional information they update their beliefs 
about productivity parameter using Bayes' rule in equation (18).
Part 2: if condition (17) does not hold, s < a(N – 1) De, only congruent 
councilor reports his observed information. Given the information structure, 
councilor receives an informative signal r and given lemma 1, employees elect 
a representative who reports r = θ. Then because congruent councilor always 
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hides information in state 1only a congruent incumbent is re-elected with pro-
bability p1 + p4 and non-congruent councilor is re-elected with probability p4 . 
As before, if employees receive an informative report r = θ, they exert their pre-
ferred effort, but given the fact that non-congruent councilor hides information 
in state 1, they update their beliefs about low productivity with the updating 
rule in equation (19) ■
Proposition 6: Given lemma 1, when a councilor receives the same wage 
that regular employees (w), the workforce cannot discipline all of type of coun-






**  will report his observed information.
Proof: The lemma 1 implies the trade-off between hide or report informa-
tion given by condition (17). In addition, if councilor's compensation is equal 
to the wages for regular employees (i.e. s = w), then we can use condition (17) 
with equality and making a a function of wages and other parameters in that 







and a councilor with a parameter a ≥ a** does not report his observed infor-
mation in state of nature 1 ■
We can compare the case of collusion with contingent monetary transfers 
and election mechanism. When workforce can give contingent monetary pay-
ment to the councilors, employees can gives more incentives to the councilors 
to report the truth than the case of re-elections. Under contingent monetary 
transfers workers can incentivize councilors with a parameter a lower or equal 
than a*, which is always higher than a**.
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Summing up, councilors always should act in the worker's interest if they 
have a professional compensation for his task and the employees' capacity to 
incentivize councilors (non-congruent councilors) would increases with the level 
of compensation. Councilors as monitors of many aspects of organization's life 
have valuable information that any collective agreement must take into account 
if the objective is to implement the representativeness at the workplace.
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5.1 Discussion
Recently, economists have begun to consider employee participation as business 
strategy to increase firm's performance. In a narrower sense employee participa-
tion and codetermination at a single workplace or firm is used as equivalent to 
industrial democracy. Employee participation may be direct or indirect. Direct 
participation involves the employees themselves, whereas indirect participation 
takes place through an intermediary of employee representative committee, 
such as works council. In this paper we have studied the effects of representa-
tive industrial democracy on employees' welfare. Specifically, we consider the 
European version of workplace representation- works councils, which is an 
elected body bounded to its constituents only through elections but is commit-
ted to functions set by law, including a duty to consider the business's interests.
Works councils may be heterogeneous about congruency with its consti-
tuency. For instance, the industrial dialog between representatives and mana-
gement in Europe has lived important periods of conflicts resolution at work-
place.8 But councilors may also be self-interested. We have formalized this fact 
by considering that works councils are heterogeneous in their preferences for 
management's monetary transfers. Hence, employees face representatives that 
may or may not have congruent interests with them. Note that better informed 
worker representative can use information opportunistically, possibly through 
coalitions against other levels of the hierarchy (i.e. management, the most in-
formed party) to misreport the real value of reform's costs.
Conversely with the positive view of workplace representation supported 
by the Pacts for employment and competitiveness, in large companies like Vo-
lkswagen, works councils seem to pursue their own objectives regardless the 
workforce welfare. From our main results, workplace representation should be 
a useful employee-voice (communication channel) if two conditions are taking 
into account at the election process: i) transparency on the works councils' bene-
fits, or at least legislation should regulate office facilities for representatives. ii) 
Works councils should have information rights and participation on reform that 
does not have large uncertainty in costs (i.e. reforms with large consequences 
on costly effort for employees). In these cases, a referendum (direct employee 
participation) or human resource management-HRM should give a larger em-
ployees' welfare and avoid coordination failures within organization.
8 The European Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions has 
documented several cases of Pacts for employment and competitiveness signed between 
representatives and employers that have had a well acceptance for workforce (see http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/pecs.htm).
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6. Conclusions
This paper tries to explain why in some times of the industrial conflict reso-
lutions councilors seem closer to management policies than workers' interest. 
The paper underlines the effect of potential coalitions among management and 
self-interested workers representatives. Under assumption than workers can 
pay contingent monetary transfers to the councilors if the Councilor's interest is 
very different from the workforce's interest (i.e. a > a**) a worker representative 
would be not implemented even if the workforce is large enough to compensate 
the Councilors' representative activities. It happens because workers perceive 
the lack of congruence as a cost of contracting with a Councilor.
A potential explanation for the recent scandals in the European industrial 
relations is the lack of incentives for Councilors. Councilor with a professional 
compensation, which should be different than employees, for his task acts in 
the interest of their constituency. Since councilors have relevant information 
for the efficiency within the firm and they are an important component for the 
industrial relations any collective agreement should consider this fact in the 
councilor's compensation. Well remunerated Councilors are more important 
in large firms, firms with large uncertainty on its productivity and where the 
effect of additional effort is relevant for the production.
When councilors are well compensated for their representative activities 
they would face an inter-temporal trade-off between accepting management's 
transfers at first period and losing rents at the second period. Councilors' com-
pensation should increase with how much they weight management's trans-
fers. Also, it should increase in firms where additional effort has a large effect 
on output, which depends on the size of workforce and the effect of high effort 
per worker on output. It occurs because the effect of additional effort on output 
is the source of potential management's bribes. Formally, the effect on Works 
Councils presence is higher than the case with monetary transfers. Since emplo-
yees cannot set up councilor's compensation contingent on the state of nature 
reduces the possibilities on punish councilors by hidden information.
The future research should consider further consequences of a wrong coun-
cilor compensation schemes. For instance, bad compensated non-congruent 
councilor cannot only act against the workers' interest, but also congruent 
councilors may take very extreme positions against management policies. Ex-
treme positions like the recommendation of low effort even under high levels 
of uncertainty can be generate large inefficiencies for the firm and workforce. 
When councilor is compensated as an employee the accountability process may 
screen incumbents with high preference for manager's rents but it generates 
inefficient behaviour for congruent representatives. Since congruent councilor 
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want to be in office he signal his type to the workforce to reject any additional 
effort under uncertainty. Then under low productivity shocks the low effort 
generates a bad performance and the firm cannot pay its industrial negotiated 
wages. Accountability process, under a pool of heterogeneous candidates, may 
press to congruent councilors to take extreme positions. This can be the addi-
tional wrong side of industrial democracy with bad compensation schemes for 
workers representatives.
Finally, another research agenda should consider that a councilor has mul-
tiples constituencies. For example, many members of the Works Councils in 
Germany have union membership and they have the support of their union. 
Councilors should take into account not only the workforce interest but also 
the union interest. When the pool of candidates for Works Councils board is 
chosen by the main union on the workplace the workforce faces a set of more 
homogeneous councilor and the accountability mechanism can help to disci-
pline them. The effect of screening of the right candidates can be reduced by 
the union membership.
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Annexes
A.1. Proof of proposition 2: The Lagrangian for program (P0) with congruent 
councilor is equal to:
 Lsi = (N – 1) {p1w + p2 – pψ(w – pψ) + p3[p(w – ψ) + (1 – p)w] + p4(w – ψ)} – (p1s1 
+ p2s2 + p3s3 + p4s4) + µ1 {p1υ(s1) + p2υ(s2) + p3υ(s3) + p4υ(s4) – υ(s0)}
where µ1 is the lagrangian multiplier. The part i) of proposition 2 results 
from the first order condition with respect to councilor's payment si, which are
 




1, 2, 3, 4i
1
Because employees want to pay as less as it is possible to the councilor the 
participation constraint is binding (µ1 > 0). With µ1 > 0 the councilor receives 
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the same payment in each state of nature s1 = s2 = s3 = s4. And the participation 
constraint in the problem implies that this payment is equal to councilor's 
outside opportunity s0. The part ii) in proposition 2 results from the disclosed 
information by the councilor: in state 1, when councilor observes high produc-
tivity parameter r = θ, employees exert low effort e = e. When a low productivity 
parameter is observed (r = θ), employees exert high effort e = e. In state 2 and 
state 3 workers update their beliefs and exert high effort if
 














Employees without worker representative implements high effort given 1 – 
ρ, so they will either implement high effort if pr (θ = θ | r = Ø) ≥ 1 – ρ. Note that 
the only condition to satisfy this inequality states that the probability of state 2 
should be at least as larger as probability of state 3 p3 ≥ p2.
A.2. Proof of proposition 3: The Lagrangian for program (P0) with non-con-
gruent councilor is equal to:
 Lsi = (N – 1) {p1w + p2 (w – pψ) + p3[p(w – ψ) + (1 – p)w] + p4(w – ψ)} – (p1s1 + 
p2s2 + p3s3 + p4s4) + µ1 {p1υ(s1) + p2υ(s2) + p3υ(s3) + p4υ(s4) – υ(s0)} + µ2{s1 – s2 – 
ap(N – 1) De}
Where µ1 and µ2 are the Lagrangian multiplier. The part i) of proposition 3 
























































when low effort is exerted the incentive constraint does not matter and the 
problem is the same than the case of congruent councilors. However if high 
effort is exerted we should consider the effect of potential collusion. As before, 
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participation constraint is binding, which implies that µ1 > 0. When µ2 > 0 the first 
order condition implies that υ'(s1) < υ'(s3) < υ'(s2). Then s1 > s3 = s2 > s4. Moreover, 
with µ2 > 0, the incentive constraint is binding and s1 = s2 + ap(N – 1) De. If s1 > s2 
then it is necessary that p = 1, otherwise it is impossible. Then s1 = s2 + a(N – 1) 
De. In state 3 and state 4 there is not informational problems, so the payment are 
fixed at the level of outside opportunity such that s3 = s4 = s0.
As before, part iii) in proposition 3 results from the information revealed by 
the councilor: in sate 1, when councilor observes high productivity the allocation 
of effort is equal to e = e, and e = e at state 4. In state 2 and state3 workers update 
their beliefs and exert high effort if
 














As before, employees without worker representative implements high effort 
given 1 – ρ, so they will either implement high effort if pr (θ = θ | r = Ø) ≥ 1 – ρ. 
Note that the only condition to satisfy this inequality states that the probability 
of state 2 should be at least as larger as probability of state 3 (p3 ≥ p2).
Annex A.3
Table 1. Works councils in European countries
Country Objective Composition Representation
Austria
1th: Worker representation
2th: Co-operation with the 
managers
Body of only workers in firms 
with more than 5 employees. 
Members are elected by a pe-
riod of 4 years by secret ballot.




2th: Co-operation with the 
managers
Joint body with employees 
and employer's representati-
ves in firm with more than 100 
workers. Employer is free to 
choose its representatives.






No w.c. in traditional defi-
nition
Co-operation commit.






2th: Co-operation with the 
employers
Joint body of elected workers 
and manager (with voting 
right) Members are elected 
by a period of 4 years in firms 
with more than 50 employees. 
All the workforce 
within the firm
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Country Objective Composition Representation
Germany
1th:Worker representation
2th: Co-operation with 
unions and employer's as-
sociations.
Only workers in firms with 
more than 5 employees. Mem-
bers are elected by a period of 
4 years.




Greece 1th: Worker representation
Only workers in firms with 
more than 50 employees.
More than 20 employees in 





No w.c., only European 
w.c. employee involvement 
through unions.  
Direct: team work
Indirect: representatives are 
consulted by the manager.
Italy 1th: Worker involvement
Elected body in private firms 
with more than 50 employees.
All the workforce 





There is no single institu-
tion of w.c. However emplo-
yee representation occurs 
through two committees: 
employee committee EC 
and joint work committee-
JWC
EC is a body in firms with 
more than 15 employees. 
Members are elected from a 
list nominated by the unions 
or more than 100 worker JWC 
is a body in firms with more 
than 150 employees. Members 
are elected as in EC.






Members are elected by a se-
cret ballot in firms with more 
than 100 employees.
The candidates list is nomi-
nated by the employees un-
der consultation or not of the 
unions.





Worker commission is not 
associative. Representatives 
are elected in firms with more 
than 100 employees. Emplo-
yees nominated a list of can-
didates, who are elected in a 
secret ballot.
All the workforce 
within the firm
Spain
1th: Worker participation 
and representation.
2th: co-operation
Joint body of employer and 
worker representatives.
In firms with more than 50 
employees.
All the workforce 
within the firm
Continue
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Country Objective Composition Representation
Sweden
No w.c., only European 




Not w.c., only European 
w.c. employee involvement 
through unions. Direct: 
team work Indirect: repre-
sentatives are consulted by 
the manager.
Source: European Foundation for the improvement of living and working condition.
